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Kristeva’s Sadomasochistic Subject 
and the Sublimation of Violence 
Kelly Oliver 
Vanderbilt University 
Athena invented the rear-view mirror, which allows us to face the horror, 
not face to face, but beginning from the duplicate, the simulacrum.  
— Julia Kristeva, The Severed Head1 
Do representations of violence incite or quell violent desires and 
actions? This question—the question of the relation between mimesis and 
catharsis—is as old as Western Philosophy itself. In this essay, I attempt to 
think through how Kristeva might describe the difference between 
representations of violence that perpetuate violent desires and actions 
versus representations of violence that sublimate violent desires and thereby 
prevent violent actions. To my knowledge, Kristeva never gives a sustained 
and straightforward answer to this question. Indeed, her many discussions 
of language, representation and visual arts, along with theatre, dance, 
poetry, music, and installation pieces, suggest that artistic representation, 
and certain kinds of signifying practices, are sublimatory, that they can 
become productive homes—if only temporarily—for aggressive drives. Yet, 
exactly how and why some representations sublimate violence and others 
stimulate it is not so clearly delineated. This distinction becomes especially 
vexed when Kristeva criticizes the society of the spectacle in works such as 
New Maladies of the Soul and The Sense and Nonsense of Revolt.2 There, she 
argues that media spectacles are flattening psychic space and threatening to 
kill off the psyche or soul once and for all. This leads me to ask: what 
distinguishes representation as spectacle from representation as sublimation, 
or as transformation?  
In more psychoanalytic terms, the question is: what distinguishes forms 
of representation that work through the sadomasochistic drives and 
inaugurate our entrance into language and society, from forms of 
representation that participate in acting out those aggressive instincts? My 
attempt to answer these questions will focus on two rarely discussed, but to 
my mind pivotal, texts in Kristeva’s corpus: Kristeva’s 1998 catalogue that 
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accompanied the exhibit of decapitated heads that she curated at the Louvre, 
entitled Capital Visions (recently translated for an English-speaking audience 
with the more graphic and spectacular title The Severed Head), and a talk that 
she gave at Columbia University in 2006 at a conference on the Dead Father, 
entitled “A Father is Being Beaten to Death,” which is reflected in parts of 
her books This Incredible Need to Believe and Hatred and Forgiveness, written 
around that same time.3  
Kristeva’s Rewriting of Totem and Taboo 
In part, both The Severed Head and “A Father is Being Beaten” are 
Kristeva’s reworking of Freud’s Totem and Taboo,4 particularly in relation to 
the sadomasochistic origins of subjectivity and signification. Kristeva puts 
sadomasochistic violence at the heart of signification itself, which for her can 
be a safeguard against violent acting out; but only if it doesn’t become a new 
form of fundamentalism in the name of which we act out our most violent 
fantasies on the bodies of others. I will argue, for Kristeva, it is the 
precarious and interminable process of working through our 
sadomasochistic origins that determines whether or not we represent or act 
out, and whether or not our representations transform our violent impulses 
or merely feed them.  
Since at least Powers of Horror,5 Kristeva has repeatedly returned to 
Freud’s Totem and Taboo in order to retell the story of the primal horde, 
which not only inaugurates civil society with its taboos against murder and 
incest, but also inaugurates representation in all of its forms. This is a story 
of the violent origins of the primary processes of condensation and 
displacement that make signification possible and brand us as human 
beings. In a sense, it is Freud’s answer to the most primal, yet most 
profound, of questions: where do we come from?  I will argue that in 
Kristeva’s retelling of the story of the origins of the speaking subject, Freud’s 
murdered father becomes the beaten father, while Freud’s forbidden mother 
becomes the beheaded mother. The father beaten to death and the beheaded 
mother not only inaugurate the prohibitions against murder and incest, as 
the Freudian story goes, but also open up the possibility of sublimating the 
violence necessary to become speaking subjects; a sadomasochistic violence 
that Kristeva insists is still necessary on both the individual and the social 
levels. To set the stage for Kristeva’s latest revisions of the Freudian origin 
story, which revolves around the beaten father and the beheaded mother, 
first I will sketch some of her earlier engagements with Totem and Taboo in 
Sense and Nonsense of Revolt, and before that in Powers of Horror.  
As we know, Freud gives a provocative explanation for the origins of 
idealization and sublimation that initiate religion, civil society and 
representation. This is a story of the body giving way to the law, and of the 
animal giving way to humanity. His story of what he calls a “band of 
brothers” who kills and eats what he calls their “father,” and afterwards 
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totemizes the father out of guilt; and then develops prohibitions against 
murder and incest in order to prevent any one of the brothers from meeting 
the fate of the father, is familiar to us. On this account, there was one 
superior male (the father) who hoarded the females and shunned the other 
males (the sons or brothers). Individually none of the other males could 
over-power the superior male, but one day they banded together to kill him 
and assimilate his power through their cannibalistic feast. At this point, they 
are not much different from a pack of wolves ripping into the alpha—dog. 
What distinguishes them from wolves, however, is that they subsequently 
idealize their “prey,” the superior father, to the point that “[t]he dead father 
became stronger than the living one had been.”6 Thus, they not only 
assimilate his power and restrict that power through internalized 
prohibitions or laws resulting both from their guilt but also from their 
submission to the ideal or symbolic father that now replaces the real one.  
In Powers of Horror, Kristeva’s most significant revision of the Freudian 
narrative is her insistence on the primary role of the maternal body in the 
cannibalistic, and subsequent ritualistic, meal. Here, it is the primal feast that 
fascinates Kristeva. And along with the prohibitions against murder and 
incest, she focuses on the prohibition against cannibalism at the dawn of 
humanity. This concern leads her to an analysis of food prohibitions in 
general, which she maintains always take us back to the maternal body, the 
first source of nourishment as well as the first source of frustration. Pleasure 
becomes anguish. Or, in the terms of Melanie Klein, the good breast becomes 
the bad breast, an ambivalence that Kristeva attempts to capture with her 
notion of the abject, which is both fascinating and horrifying.  
Like Freud, Kristeva bases her analysis on anthropological literature, 
particularly Mary Douglas’s study of filth and defilement. She suggests that 
fear of the generative power of the mother makes her body abject and 
inedible, and thereby makes all bodies abject and inedible.7 She says “I give 
up cannibalism because abjection (of the mother) leads me toward respect 
for the body of the other, my fellow man, my brother.”8 Through the 
ambivalent struggle with the maternal body and the incest taboo, all human 
bodies become inedible.  
On the level of the individual, Kristeva argues that an oral aggression 
related to both food and speech revolves around a fear of loss of the mother 
aggravated by threats of punishment by the father.9 The child feels 
aggression in response to its fear both of the loss of maternal satisfaction and 
of paternal prohibition instituted by the incest taboo. Kristeva sees a pre—
objectal aggression that comes from bodily drives and latches onto totemic 
symbols that stand in for, rather than represent, everything threatening and 
scary in the child’s young life: “Fear and the aggressivity intended to protect 
me from some not yet localizable cause are projected and come back to me 
from the outside: ‘I am threatened.’”10 The child responds to both 
deprivation and prohibition with aggressive impulses, which in the case of 
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the maternal body may literally include the urge to bite or devour, to 
incorporate, the maternal body in order to hold on to it.  
The child’s own aggressivity, then, is projected onto something outside 
of itself, for example a phobic animal, as a shield not only against the 
deprivation and prohibition exercised toward it by its parents but also 
against its own violent impulses. At this stage, these impulses revolve 
around incorporation as an attempt to devour and thereby possess the 
parental love (not-yet) object. At the same time that the child is learning 
language and incorporating the words of its parents, it is trying to 
incorporate them. For the infant, the mouth is the first center of bodily 
cathexis associated with pleasure, deprivation, and language acquisition. 
Words, like breast-milk and food, pass through its mouth. Kristeva 
interprets the phobic’s fantasies of being bitten, eaten, or devoured by a 
scary animal as a projection of its own aggressive drives, particularly the 
urge to bite, eat, or devour the maternal body. As we will see, in The Severed 
Head, the mother’s face becomes the quintessential figure for the 
condensation of the abject scary devouring mouth and the radiant 
reassuring loving smile.  
In Sense and Nonsense of Revolt, Kristeva reads Freud’s Totem and Taboo in 
terms of the assimilation of authority through cannibalism, or the 
assimilation of the body, and representation, or the assimilation of language. 
But, now she adds an emphasis on the break between the timelessness of 
animal instincts and bodily drives and the linear temporality of signification 
onto, and into, which they are discharged. She suggests that the institution 
of memory in the totemic rituals represses timelessness, the timelessness of 
the drives. Her invocation of archaic timelessness gives us another motive 
for the repetition of rituals that assimilate the authority and power of the 
primal father. Rather than just repeating the crime as a reminder of lack and 
debt on the one hand, and of the mobility of power on the other, repeating 
the timelessness of animal experience become bodily drive also frees us from 
prohibition and guilt and puts us in touch with the rhythms of the body and 
its pleasures and pains outside of linear time. Rather than merely repeat 
guilt and prohibition, idealization opens the space for a repetition of 
timelessness within linear time, a repetition that Kristeva identifies with the 
celebratory excess, or jouissance, of the feast. The origin story is not just the 
story of fixed totems or taboos, but also the story of how bodily drives 
become meaningful through signifying rituals even as they exceed those 
rituals. It is the story of animal instincts become human drives; ultimately it 
is the story of the fluidity of desire.  
Desire is not conceived of as the flip side of prohibition; rather, desire 
reverberates with longing for an archaic timelessness of our embodiment. 
On the level of the social, this timelessness is associated with animality and 
the transition from animal to human, while on the level of the individual, it 
is associated with the infant’s relation to the maternal body, and the 
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transition from dependence to independence. In a sense, this timelessness is 
the absolute unity of being and meaning — what Freud might call the death 
drive, and later what Kristeva associates with the timelessness of death 
itself, which is outside of time and invisible, but can be rendered visible 
through artistic representation: “Death exists outside time: we can’t see it; 
we must be content with varying our capital visions of it. Absolute cult or 
ultimate revenge?”11  
I will return to this question, but for now we can describe sublimation 
not only as a process of redirecting sexual and aggressive instincts à la 
Freud’s totem and taboo, but also as a process of discharging the 
timelessness of the drives (of the animal and of the preoedipal subject) into 
time (the temporality of the human and of the individual). Indeed, as I have 
argued elsewhere, we can go further and diagnose Freud’s account of the 
killing become murder and subsequent guilt become prohibition as a 
displacement of this archaic timelessness into taboos—Thou Shalt Not—that 
take the form of Universal Principles, Eternal Truths, or Divine (timeless) 
Commandments.12 This operation is the displacement of the timelessness of 
bodily drives into the Eternal through which Absolute Good becomes an 
unforgiving Ideal opposed to its abject opposite Absolute Evil. The ideals of 
Good and Evil are beyond the realm of our embodied finite animality, and 
thereby deny everything bodily and finite in life; which, of course, is the 
process that Freud describes in Totem and Taboo as the violent beginnings of 
religion. 
In terms of psychoanalysis, this form of idealization becomes a harsh 
and punishing super-ego that makes extreme demands as a defense against 
contamination by its disowned and abjected otherness, which it must 
exclude to define itself as clean and proper. Kristeva associates this form of 
idealization and abjection with fundamentalism and the self—righteous 
violence to which it can lead. She says:  
The pure and absolute subject—call him the purifier—
defends himself against the maternal from which he is 
separating through anti-taint rituals while at the same 
time defending himself against the murder of the father 
through feelings of guilt, contrition, repentance. Therefore 
what appears to be purity in the eyes of the religion and 
the purifiers is only an obsessional surface that conceals a 
veritable architecture of purity… to fight the various 
forms of fundamentalism and violence that appear to be 
the sorry privilege of this end of the century [we need to 
take] into consideration what produces it, namely, the 
disgust with taint and the consequent contrition, 
repentance, and guilt that present themselves as qualities 
of religion but also profoundly constitute the psychical life 
of the being capable of symbolicity: the speaking being.13  
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In This Incredible Need to Believe, she calls this type of religious idealization 
that leads to violence the “malady of ideality.” 
We have now come full circle, back to a more nuanced version of the 
question with which we started: namely, what determines whether 
repetitions of the primal festival will take the form of violent acting out or 
sublimation of violence? Can we determine what rituals or signifying 
practices discharge the sadomasochistic drives at the heart of subjectivity by 
inflicting violence on others versus those that sublimate those drives and 
thereby transform the desire for violence and death into something creative? 
Within Kristeva’s terminology, another version of our question is: what 
distinguishes perversion from sublimation? Certainly, the answer to this 
question has everything to do with the processes of idealization and 
representation that Freud describes in Totem and Taboo, and Kristeva 
elaborates throughout her work, as the move from animal to human on the 
social level, and on the individual level, the move away from the maternal 
body and towards the paternal law—what in everyday language, we call 
“weaning.”  
A Mother is Being Beheaded 
Tracing our fascination with decapitation, beheading, and severed 
heads from prehistoric cave paintings through Warhol’s Marilyn Monroe 
diptych, in The Severed Head, Kristeva repeatedly argues that all of these 
detached heads represent both the mother’s face—that primal lost loving 
gaze—and representation itself insofar as we associate thought with the 
head. The figure of the head brings together our most archaic fears and 
desires along with our most effective means for sublimating them. Relating 
early cannibalistic rituals and skull fetishes to Freud’s narrative of the primal 
horde, Kristeva once again transfers the originary founding violence from 
Freud’s paternal figure to a maternal one. She claims:  
the skull and the face, primary targets for the gaze, appear 
to us as privileged stations in the loss of maternal 
dependence. To assimilate the head of the other, to absorb 
the mother’s milk of the brain…the cannibalistic ritual is 
as much if not more an appropriation of the mother’s 
power than a devouring of the father—tyrant….Thus we 
may read in [the totemic feast] a double celebration: that 
of the rival phallic father and that of the mother who 
abandoned us … From this totemic perspective, the 
assimilation of the head also seems to be a possible archaic 
equivalent for incest …14 
Indeed, she calls the phallic cover up of maternal power a “construction 
‘after the fact’ [Nachträglich].”15 Thus, she concludes: “To eat, to kill, to 
possess, to represent.”16  
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On both the social and individual levels, we become speaking subjects 
by moving away from literal killing and eating and towards their 
metaphorical analogues in representations, assimilation and substitution. 
Rather than eating the primal father or the mother’s milk, we assimilate their 
words; and rather than killing them, we substitute symbols that represent 
our violent impulses, for example, images of severed heads. Yet, Kristeva 
insists that these representations are sublimatory only insofar as they do not 
merely represent aggressive drives, but rather discharge them, and more 
importantly, transform them. In The Severed Head, she uses words like 
alchemy, transubstantiation, transformation, transfiguration, passage, 
modulation, osmosis, metabolization, compensation, and at the extreme, 
resurrection, salvation and rebirth, to describe the process by which 
representation sublimates bodily drives, particularly primal urges for 
cannibalism, incest, and murder.  
As she does when describing the revolution in poetic language in her 
early work, she insists that the intimate revolt, as she now calls it, which she 
associates with becoming an individual and that is repeated in each 
sublimatory representation, is not mimesis or a copying of drives in 
language.17 Bodily drives are neither the objects represented nor the 
referents of those objects (or images or symbols as the case may be). Rather, 
through what she calls an imprint, an infiltration, an inscription of the body, 
a sign replaces the absent body, which always takes us back to the absent 
maternal body. The missing body, and at some level any missing object, 
including the phallus threated with castration, is always the mother’s 
missing face, source of joy and terror. Kristeva claims that we hallucinate 
her, see her image, and then fabricate word—signs. We thereby compensate 
for our separation from her, for the cut, by taking control through 
representation: “For capital disappearance of mother’s face, I substitute 
capital vision—images words language,” which is another form of 
“incarnation.”18  
As always, Kristeva emphasizes the materiality of representation. In The 
Severed Head, she discusses the material elements of drawing, painting, and 
sculpture. Through art, we can get distance from our wounds and give them 
meaning that allows us to work through trauma and protects us from the 
worst violence: “No bombast, no savagery, you are distanced and sheltered 
from the cannibals, the terrorists.”19 Through art, she says, “slaughter turned 
to image assuages the violence, more or less repressed or mastered, of 
individuals and nations…” and through  
… alchemy in which the representation comes of a 
grieving, a renunciation, a castration, a death. There is 
something beyond death, the artistic experience says, 
there is resurrection…Decapitation is a privileged space. 
Exulate, jubilate!20  
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The idea is that rather than decapitate, we draw or paint severed heads.  
Kristeva goes so far as to say that these visions of severed heads are the 
opposite of acts of decapitation. Discussing the French Revolution and the 
Reign of Terror, she begins a chapter on the guillotine:  
In opposition to the imaginary intimacy with death, which 
transforms melancholy or desire into representation and 
thought, lies the rational realization of the capital act. 
Vision and action are polar opposites here, and the 
revolutionary Terror confronts us with that revolting 
abjection practiced by humanity under the guise of an 
egalitarian institution of decapitation.21  
She concludes the chapter, “the profusion of images and symbols has a 
chance of thwarting the temptations of real actions…After all, if art is 
transfiguration, it has political consequences.”22  
At this point, it seems as if Kristeva answers our original question with 
a resounding affirmation, namely, that representations quell rather than 
incite violence; indeed, representations may be the only way to prevent the 
worst violence. And, although the question of whether all representation 
prevents violence is still an open one, we have begun to get some clues as to 
how representation can sublimate violent drives. First and foremost, 
representation transforms drives into something else (words, painting, 
sculpture) through which they are discharged without resorting to violence. 
Second, representation takes the place of the missing maternal face and 
thereby compensates for the absence and loss that incite violence and 
thereby softens and counterbalances the paternal prohibitions against 
cannibalism, murder and incest that allow us to live together without eating 
each other. Third, art—and we could add psychoanalysis—allow us to get 
distance from loss and pain, and this detachment protects us from their 
crippling effects.  
In Hatred and Forgiveness, she likens this detachment to a mother’s love 
for a child that she must let go; there, Kristeva calls this process “de-
passion,” or “de-passioning,” which is also a de-eroticizing necessary for 
sublimation of sadomasochistic drives that simultaneously threaten and 
inaugurate speech. In addition, artistic representation transforms the artist 
from a passive victim of trauma into an active agent of creativity. Thus, art 
transforms its subjects, in both senses of the word “subject”: the subject 
matter of the work and the creator of the work.23  
The relationship between the work of art and working through trauma 
takes us to our second, and more difficult, question: what sorts of 
representations prevent violence and what sorts actually incite violence? 
Certainly we have seen enough inflammatory rhetoric, particularly from 
religious fundamentalists of all sorts, to know that not all representation 
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quells violence but rather some exhorts it. Kristeva begins to answer this 
question in The Severed Head when she suggests that in order to be 
sublimatory, representation has to avoid becoming dogmatic, ideological, or 
fundamentalist. Conversely, when it becomes dogmatic or ideological, it 
risks perpetuating rather than preventing violence. Indeed, it can become 
the ideal in the name of which we commit violent acts.  
So, as Kristeva asks, how do we avoid becoming dogmatic and 
ideological? She answers:  
Quite simply through talent that does not succumb to the 
object, that avoids the fetish…through the invention of an 
unprecedented form, which doesn't shrink from abjection 
but reshapes our vision so that we see it with new eyes.24  
The object of art cannot become a fetish; rather, it must always be a passage, 
a transition, and fluid rather than fixed. We must concentrate on the work of 
art, in its double meaning, rather than the artwork as an object. It is the 
process of figuration, particularly the drive force or primary processes that 
motivate it that make art sublimatory, not the object of art per se. This is why 
one and the same art work or art object can aggravate or alleviate violence. 
And, why Kristeva maintains that we must be persistently “faithful[ness] to 
the cut,” which simultaneously does both. We must leave open the wound, 
trauma or loss, the horror, out of which creative representation is born, and 
through which it offers us rebirth, as she would say.25  
The difference, then, between spectacle that incites violence and art that 
sublimates it is that spectacles reinforce one way of seeing the world while 
works of art open up new ways of seeing; they are an “anti-metaphysical 
metaphysics,” which constantly questions the foundations of all 
fundamentalisms: “abandon the spectacle and find a kind of face that has 
not yet found its face, that never will, but that never stops seeking a 
thousand and one ways of seeing. This is the intimacy they make us 
imagine, sensual seekers of the visible incarnation, the path of 
incarnation.”26 The process that Kristeva describes is an ongoing one of 
cathexis and de-cathexis that leads to more questions than answers. For, 
without constant questioning, any interpretation or belief risks becoming 
fetishized fundamentalism in the name of which we kill and “eat” each 
other.  
A Father is Being Beaten 
In the essay “A Father is Being Beaten to Death”—along with This 
Incredible Need to Believe—Kristeva continues to delineate the difference 
between forms of belief that open up questioning and those that close it 
down. There, she describes her analysis of the child’s identification with a 
beating and suffering father as a rereading of Freud’s Totem and Taboo, 
inflected by his theories in “A Child is Being Beaten,” where the guilt that 
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underlies the beating fantasy is the underside of desire for the father. 
Following Freud, she argues that the beating fantasy is at the origin of 
individuation and subject constitution, and of sexual difference, now 
described in terms of differential relations to the beating fantasy. If, in The 
Severed Head, sadomasochism is “the secret of the unconscious,” as Kristeva 
calls it, and takes center stage as the flip side of sublimation. Language is 
both derived from, and sublimates, sadomasochistic desires for incest and 
murder of both parents, on the one hand, and the superego’s pleasure in 
self-punishment for those very desires on the other. Both the desires and 
their prohibitions are simultaneously channeled into representation. This, of 
course, is the familiar story of Freud’s totem and taboo.  
The guilt in killing the primal father comes from identification with him 
and his suffering, which is an essential part of the dynamic of substitution 
initiated by totemic rituals. In order for a symbol to substitute for the dead 
father, the son (or daughter) must first be able to identify with him and his 
suffering. And for Kristeva, the first substitution for the mother as object of 
incestuous desire is a narcissistic one, wherein the infant’s own body takes 
the place of the missing maternal body, through autoeroticism. But in order 
for the next stage in the process of substitutions to take place, the intensity of 
the eroticism connected to sadomasochistic desires for both parents must be 
transferred to language. Representation itself becomes a new love object that 
enables us to survive the loss of the maternal body and skirt the punishment 
of the paternal law.27 We could simply say that through representation we 
cope with all loss, guilt and punishment, whether the traumatic loss of the 
mother’s face and our infantile connections to our first caregivers, or the big 
and small losses and victimizations that we suffer throughout our lives. 
Indeed, in order to survive them, we must take pleasure, even if perverse 
pleasure, in representing our melancholy experiences. Kristeva postulates:  
In addition to masochistic perversity (“I take pleasure in 
the fantasy of being beaten”) is the sublimatory jouissance 
of my own capacity to say and to think for and with the 
beloved/loving. I want to emphasize that from the 
beginning sublimation accompanies this perverse defense, 
and perversion acts as sublimation’s double.28  
The sadomasochistic identification with the beaten father is a defense 
against the father of the law and his punishment and thereby an essential 
part of the process of idealization that enables the intimate revolts necessary 
for individuation. The suffering father is the latest incarnation of Kristeva’s 
imaginary father introduced in Tales of Love as the necessary support of the 
move away from the maternal body and towards the paternal law. Here, the 
suffering father plays the role of bridge between the two. His incarnation 
and victimization allow the subject to bond with a paternal most like itself; 
that is to say, the infant or child as victim of the paternal law can find an 
alternate ideal in the father as victim. This identification supports the 
K e l l y  O l i v e r  |  2 3  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXI, No 1 (2013)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2013.570 
intimate revolt against the paternal authority that, in a paradoxical move, 
authorizes the subject and its entrance into the symbolic.  
An identification with the beaten father counter-balances the punishing 
paternal super-ego by allowing the girl or boy sadomasochistic pleasure in 
punishment, which is doubled by sadistically turning the tables on the 
punishing father of the law and subjecting him to a beating, and then in turn 
masochistically identifying with his victimhood and what becomes sweet 
suffering. Kristeva observes: “Beaten, I join my father once again; we are 
united by these nuptials under the whip…we are both in love and guilty and 
both deserve to be beaten.”29 The passion of Christ is Kristeva’s prime 
example of the “a father is being beaten to death” fantasy. Substituting the 
Christian fantasy of the suffering Christ beaten to death, for the Freudian 
father murdered and eaten by the primal horde, Kristeva goes on to describe 
how identification with him supports the possibility of sublimation and the 
transfer of erotic intensity to symbolic activity itself: 
The resexualization of the ideal father as Man of Passion 
brings about an unprecedented resexualization of 
representation itself, of the very activity of fantasizing and 
of speaking…. The activity of representing-speaking-
thinking, attributed to the father in patrilineal societies 
and which connects me to him, now becomes the 
privileged realm of sadomasochistic pleasure, the 
“kingdom” indeed, where suffering opens out, justifies 
and appeases itself … Perversion and sublimation are the 
flip sides of this flexibility, if not of this fabulous 
suspension of the incest taboo induced by the beaten- to-
death father.30 
Again, Kristeva emphasizes incestuous desires and their taboos as the 
primary motivators for becoming speaking subjects. Representation not only 
compensates for the loss of these first loves, but also transforms desire for 
them into desire for language. Moreover, it transforms the passive victim of 
parental love and punishment into an active agent, while also turning the 
threatening parents into passive victims. The punishing father becomes the 
beaten father and the castrating mother becomes the beheaded mother. The 
perpetrator becomes the victim—but one with whom we identify; and, with 
these sadomasochistic fantasies we find both revenge and reunion through 
imaginary and symbolic satisfactions. In this way, we not only separate from 
our parents to become individuals, but also we cope with the pain of that 
separation, the separation that prefigures all others. 
 But, Kristeva also insists that imaginary and symbolic identification 
with suffering is a depassioning; so it is at once the transfer of erotic drives 
into representation and the transformation of those drives from passion to 
depassion, from eroticism to de-eroticism. And it is this transformation that 
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allows us to embrace them, that puts them beyond the taboo, and provides 
us with sublimatory jouissance. Ultimately, with and against the death 
drive, representation makes the primary separation—which comes to stand 
for all pain, loss, trauma, and the very meaninglessness of life—into 
something meaningful, even sacred. Kristeva says, “understood as a 
traversal, by thought, of the unthinkable: of nothingness, uselessness, the 
vain and the mad” we are confronted not with religion but with the sacred.31  
This distinction between religion and the sacred brings us back to the 
fragile distinction between dogmatism and sublimation. When the sacred 
becomes fixed in religion, it becomes dogmatic and risks becoming 
fundamentalism through which we justify violence. It becomes the malady 
of ideality. But, if the process of idealization necessary for a meaningful life 
is held open to constant questioning and reinterpretation through new forms 
of representation, then there is the possibility for sublimation of the 
sadomasochistic drives, which might prevent such violence. Rather than 
latching on to the ideal and becoming fanatical about it, we open it up to 
new ways of seeing, new fantasies of death and rebirth.  
This is what Kristeva does in her own work, signaled by her use of 
questions that provide different ways of interpreting the same phenomena. 
For example, when in The Severed Head, she asks, “What is the power of 
representation? Does the image succumb to the violence of death, or does it 
possess the gift of modulating it?”32 This style of constant back-and-forthing, 
of either-or, of both/and, is also what sometimes makes her work frustrating 
and difficult to pin down. But also it is what opens it up to interpretation. 
Through the use of questions throughout her writing, she leaves open 
possibilities and complexities rather than closing them down or resolving 
them.  
Kristeva maintains that the challenge to continually question our own 
investments in violence is unique to psychoanalysis. In her introduction to 
This Incredible Need to Believe, entitled “The Big Question Mark,” she argues 
that speaking in analysis becomes a questioning that “renders us capable of 
new bonds…the bond of investment in the process of symbolization itself.”33 
With its constant reinterpretations of our losses and frustrations, it allows us 
to take pleasure in the pain of separation and of reunion over and over again 
in language. “The founder of psychoanalysis,” she says,  
began by making love lie down on the couch. In order to 
return to the love of the father and the mother, and on 
taking the gamble… that ‘I’ am capable of going beyond 
my genitors indeed beyond myself and my loves, on the 
condition of being subject to perpetual dissolution in 
analysis, in transference and counter-transference. This 
presupposes that there is not only a Dead Father, but also 
figures of paternity and of loves, in the plural, in which I 
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take pleasure, which I kill and which I resuscitate when I 
speak, love and think.34  
Even more than art, psychoanalysis allows us to kill and resuscitate in 
speech as protection against the pain and suffering caused by our violent 
drives. 
Like Athena protected by (and from) Medusa’s head, psychoanalysis 
provides a rearview mirror in which we can see ourselves reflected over and 
over again in new ways. By so doing, with and against religion and its too 
often deadly call for violence, psychoanalysis opens up the sacred space of 
intimate revolt, which Kristeva calls “psychic space or the life of the mind,” 
or we could say, thought itself. Psychoanalysis acts as a counterbalance to 
the deadly force of fundamentalisms by offering:  
a space for reflection in which the effort of clarification 
takes precedence over the deadly confrontation between a 
tendency for regression on the one hand and the explosion 
of the death drives on the other, which together now 
threaten our globalized humanity.35  
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